Introduction
More than 30 years of an oppressive regime, and the ensuing war in 2003, have devastated Iraqi society and imposed a large public mental health crisis on the population. Forced migration of over four million people, pervasive human rights abuses, and years of daily violence since the 2003 invasion, have taken a toll, both on the individual and on the society. Approximately 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are estimated to be in Iraq (UNHCR, 2011) . In addition, almost 50% of the total Iraqi population is comprised of those below 18 years of age, posing a signi¢cant challenge for policy on mental health. Although the overall impact is unknown, the increased mental health burden is high, and demands that mental health policymakers adequately respond to the crisis. In order to better understand the experiences faced in the Iraqi context, and to contribute to the dialogue on best practice guidelines for other states in transition, this paper will examine mental health policy development in post invasion Iraq.
Methodology
Because the study was initially conducted in the autumn of 2007, the period selected for review was 2003 to 2007. For this period, a retrospective qualitative case study methodology was utilised (an intensive analysis of a process which took place in the past using qualitative methods to study it), supported by literature reviews and key informant interviews, in order to gather data. Over 40 documents from scienti¢c and peerreviewed journals, newspapers, various institutions (including the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), key nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) such as Medact, and donors, mental health institutions, academic institutions and unpublished 'grey' policy documents were collected and analysed. A Iraq and mental health policy: a post invasion analysis Intervention 2011, Volume 9, Number 3, Page 332 -344 select group of international and Iraqi experts were surveyed, all with experience, either directly in Iraq or indirectly with post con£ict health reconstruction in low and middle income countries. A snowballing technique identi¢ed potential interviewees. Of 35 people contacted, 21 responded (60%) and were interviewed over a six-week period in August^September 2007, either by telephone, or in person where possible. Interviews were conducted in English, using a semi-structured interview tool with 20 open-ended questions divided among the following topics: drivers and in£uences of mental health policy, planning of services, achievements in mental health, obstacles to mental health reform, e¡ect of the war on the mental health burden, and the role of NGOs and other stakeholders. Of the 21 respondents, the group consisted of ¢ve civil society leaders in mental health service delivery, seven senior experts in policymaking for mental health service delivery, and nine mental health professionals, both from within and outside of Iraq, across six countries. Only three of these respondents were located (at the time of the study) in Iraq, due to security issues. Consumers were contacted, but all declined to participate due to personal security issues. Data obtained from key informant interviews was cross-referenced, and substantiated by written literature to ensure accuracy. Methodology for data analysis consisted of thematic analysis on interview content, grey policy documents, and literature reviewed using Walt's analysis (Walt,1994) as a framework for mental health policy analysis.Walt's analysis was chosen due to its framing of health policy within an economic and political perspective in low and middle income countries and its use across various countries and areas of health, including mental health (De Vries & Klazinga, 2006; Stockwell et al., 2005) .The framework organises thematic content into four areas: context, actors, content of policy, and process, and speci¢cally examines the interaction between these four areas. This paper is organised into two sections on context and content/process. The authors utilised this methodology as a means to better understand various in£uences and factors in mental health policy development, post invasion. Because this paper was submitted a few years after the key informant interviews took place, an additional review of the literature was conducted to analyse the period since 2007, in order to have a more comprehensive and updated view. However, due to budget and time constraints, follow-up interviews of respondents were not conducted, and therefore not incorporated into the policy analysis.
Ethical considerations
A description of this project, and a request for informed consent, were sent by email to all respondents. Those in insecure environments with no internet access were briefed about the project by telephone. Personal information was not collected on participants, and all information obtained from interviews was anonymous, unless otherwise speci¢ed in the report. For participant protection, no protocol approval was needed for this study.
Limitations of our analyses
Limitations of the analysis include lack of consumers interviewed due to security issues and language barrier, under-representation of Iraq-based respondents due to insecurity and poor access to communication, exclusion of those who did not speak English; predominance of senior leaders and sta¡ rather than mid-level respondents; and exclusion of those in insecure environments 
Background and context of mental health policy development
Following a bloodless military coup in 1968, the Ba'athists came to power in Iraq for almost four decades of totalitarian rule. Human rights abuses such as torture, assassinations, disappearances, detentions, forced conscription, and amputations were pervasive during this period (Amowitz et al., 2004) . Although Iraq initially prospered under Saddam's rule, the economy and civil society weakened with increasing militarisation of the country. Military expenditure rose from 19. 4% of GDP in 1975 , to 38.4% in 1985 , peaking at 70.1% in 1981 (Al-Khalil, 1989 .
Further con£ict ensued with the Iran/Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, the invasion by Iraq into Kuwait in1990 and1991, and subsequent UN sanctions due to the invasion of Kuwait. Oil revenues, which had generously ¢nanced much of the social services in Iraq through the 1970s, ceased and health care costs were no longer met. The UN Oil for Food Programme began in 1996 in response to the crisis, and required that two thirds of oil proceeds were earmarked for humanitarian needs (UN, 2010) . By 20 March 2003, when the invasion began, both from a socio-political and economic point of view, the region had weakened. As the invasion proceeded, further destruction took place, and internal displacement worsened with 402,000 persons displaced from to 2005 (IOM, 2007 , and another 1.6 million after a shrine bombing in Samarra (ReliefWeb, 2008) (Table 1) . In the1960s and1970s, the health care system £ourished and was a model for the region with mental health services well serving Iraq and mental health policy: a post invasion analysis Intervention 2011, Volume 9, Number 3, Page 332 -344 the population (Sadik & Al-Jadiry, 2006) . Good access to roads, sanitation, water, transportation and communications supported the health care system. The health care system penetrated both urban and rural populations, providing access to 97% and 79% of Iraqis respectively, before 1991 (WHO, 2005) . Infant mortality rates were low. Health care was ¢nanced through the government, with services free of charge to the public. The Iran/Iraq war, and the invasion into KuwaitbyIraq,increasinglyconstrainedpublic spending on health care, and by 1991 total expenditure on health had declined, health care indicators worsened and health infrastructure had deteriorated. Health expenditure plummeted from 3.72% of the GDP, before the 1990s, to 0.81% of the GDP after 1997 (Iraq MoH,2004) . Infant mortality rates increased in the 1990s, with estimates of 500,000 child deaths (Lehmann, 2004) . In 1997, the system changed from a government funded scheme to a self-¢nancing system in which the cost of care is shifted to the patient. Free health care ceased to the public (WHO, 2005) . Despite hospital ownership by the Ministry of Health, health care became increasingly privatised.
Mental health system prior to the 2003 invasion
Mental health in Iraq during the Ba'athist period was a hospital-based, public model with an emphasis on long term institutional care. The government initially ¢nanced mental health care until the self-¢nancing system was introduced in 1997. Many practitioners were forced into the private system, or £ed as funding declined.
Mental health care was a low priority on the health agenda. Outside of the hospital-based system of care, psychiatrists had limited in£uence on national policy. The total mental health care burden prior to 2003 is unknown, due to scarcity of data on psychiatric epidemiology. When the invasion occurred in 2003, the mental health care system was already severely constrained in regard to public resources and human capital, and limited in its capacity to meet the demands ahead (Table 2) .
Socio-cultural context
The stigma attached to mental disorders has remained consistent over time in Iraq. Context analysis reveals: 1) the large degree of stigma leads users to seek care from primary care doctors, internists and neurologists, rather than psychiatrists; 2) most users of the mental health care system are primarily the severely mentally ill; 3) there is great reliance on local religious and cultural healers for assistance; and 4) family and communities, rather than the system of care, often assume responsibility for treating mental illness. Furthermore, according to Sadik (2010) (Razokhi et al., 2006) and highexposurelevelstotraumaticeventscorrelate with mental, behavioural and emotional issues, with prevalence rates of 10^30% for posttraumatic stress disorder (Dimitry, 2011) . In Mosul, 37.4% of children and adolescents in primary care centres were found to have mental disorders (Al-Jawadi, 2007 (WHO, 2006) .The public system transitioned from a self-¢nancing model to a centralised one. Fewer than 100 psychiatrists, and minimalancillarysta¡,servetheentirepopulation of 27 million, or 1.6 professionals in mental 
Mental health policy development: content and process post 2003 invasion
The analysisrevealsthatthecontentof mental health policy development remained fairly constant over time, but the process was continually challenged and thwarted by obstacles. The impact on government planning, action and policymaking is often an indirect consequence of con£ict (Ugalde et al., 2000) . Key components of mental health policy development in Iraq, post 2003, include:
Lobbying, strategy and planning at the Health Ministry level, Prioritisation of mental health care on the health agenda, Shift away from long term institutional care towards public and primary mental health care, Equitable distribution of access to care, Emphasis on capacity building, and Reliance on international collaborations.
The process of mental health policy development depends strongly on the governing body in power, public mental health leadership, and foreign support. Security issues and sectarian violence, lack of coordination, competing models of mental health, corruption, stigma and culture, posed grave di⁄-culties in moving the agenda forward. Key points, both with respect to content and process, will be discussed below. 
Political transitions challenging the mental health agenda

Health and public mental health leadership
Varied leadership within the health sector played a large role in both propagating and delaying a national strategy and implementation of mental health policies. During the CPA's tenure, power struggles between USAID and the Pentagon initially led to a quick change of health leadership and delays. According to respondents, from the onset, there were missed opportunities, poor health sector planning, and lack of post con£ict and regional expertise among management of the CPA (Medact, 2008 , Chandrasekaran, 2006 . The ¢rst Iraqi Interim Health Minister and the CPA declared mental health care a key priority area in 2004 (Fleck, 2004) . This declaration led to speci¢c appointments, committees and achievements within the mental health care arena. The ¢rst mental Many groups organised around the impending demand for mental health care and psychosocial services. Disenfranchised Iraqis, who had long standing concerns about the health sector, saw the invasion as an opportunity to help their country in the absence of an oppressive regime.There was an opportunity for free action that had not existed before. Iraqi psychiatrists in the UK established the Iraqi Mental Health Forum to provide supervisory and technical assistance, programme development expertise and supervision to young providers in Iraq. According to the nongovernmental organisation (NGO), Coordination Committee on (Gar¢eld, 2003) . More recently, the Ministry of Health, with the support of USAID and IMC-Iraq, has been systematically supporting the integration of mental health care into primary care in 20% of basic health facilities (Sadik et al., 2011) . Because of the success of the programme and the in£uence of donors, the Ministry will continue to fund and expand the programme to the rest of the country.
Competing models of mental health care
In response to a survey question on models of mental health care, respondents indicated that competing models of care were a source of power struggles within and between stakeholders. Health maintenance organisations (HMOs), centralised and self-¢nancing models were considered. Policymakers endorsed reform and deinstitutionalisation of the inpatient psychiatric hospital, Al Rashad. In general, there was a lack of emphasis on the existing Iraqi health infrastructure and using local capacity to rebuild the system. The consensus for Iraq's model was a public mental health model with an emphasis on primary care, multidisciplinary teams, and links to community based care (Humphreys & Sadik, 2006) . Furthermore, the Iraq Ministry of Health Strategy, 2009^2011, emphasises primary health care as a main priority, with mental health care as one of the core initiatives (Iraq MoH, 2008) . Special populations at high risk for developing mental health issues, such as refugees, IDPs, children, women, and the disabled, have speci¢c needs that should be considered in policy formulation for an appropriate model of mental health care. Child and adolescent mental health care is virtually nonexistent, for example, and advocacy e¡orts around these issues call for increased support and policy steps (Al-Obaidi, 2010) .
Sectarian violence in the health sector
Respondents repeatedly cite security as the major obstacle within the health sector. Sectarian violence and discrimination by political a⁄liation are widely pervasive throughout the health sector. Death threats against doctors, kidnappings, extortion and murders, posed a signi¢cant threat to the health workforce. Of the 34,000 doctors registered in Iraq before 2003, 17,000 £ed, 2,000 were murdered and 250 were kidnapped (O'Hanlon & Campbell, 2007) . The number of psychiatrists is purported to be below 30 for a population of 27 million. Postgraduate quali¢cations and training programmes in psychiatry su¡er due to the severe shortage of mental health professionals. Newspaper reports and respondents consistently allude to the Ministry of Health as a sectarian monopoly, teeming with corruption and involvement in alleged human rights abuses.
Corruption
Mismanagement of funding and private contracts thwarted reconstruction e¡orts.
Sharma & Piachaud
Ine⁄cient use of funds by private contractors has been well documented (Chatterjee, 2007; U.S. Senate, 2006) . Lack of transparency, funding misappropriations and diversion of supplies to the black market are among the key issues contributing to further drains of the public system.
Stigma of mental health
The stigma attached to mental illness in Iraqi society is a barrier to mental health policy making. It in£uences the position of psychiatry within medicine, and a¡ects demand for psychiatric services.
Implications of culture
Respondents stated that Iraqi culture is an obstacle in reaching consensus, working on teamsandcollaboratingacrossethnicfactions. Political a⁄liation, past historical tensions and the removal of Ba'ath party members from positions within the Iraqi government after the invasion promulgated mistrust. Further ethnographic research is needed to examine culture as an obstacle in detail.
Policy recommendations
Policy recommendations can be elucidated from this analysis in post invasion Iraq, consistent with international guidelines and expert opinion. Presented below are a series of recommendations for post con£ict mental health care, taking into consideration the context, content and process of policy development in Iraq.
Security is the ¢rst priority in ensuring sound policy development. Insecurity fragmented the process in Iraq, and constantly posed a challenge. Mental health careshould bean integrated part of the overall health strategyand focused on public mental health. A sustainable mental health care strategy is required that will survive changes in leadership. Lobbying of ministers, political will, a clear national mental health plan and budget, as well as support from the international community, can all aid in this process. The strategy should include activities such as: integration of mental health care into primary care, building specialist mental health care, community-based mental health, and mental health promotion and outreach activities. Coordinated mental health planning and programming is necessary using international guidelines (e.g. IASC, 2007) and a minimum set of activities immediately post invasion, in addition to rapid needs assessments, multi-disciplinary teams, strategies based on need, and ensuring that all stakeholders are coordinated and working to support Ministry priorities. Localcapacity, resourcesand knowledgeshouldbe harnessed to formulate a system that meets cultural needs and regional demands. Post con£ict and regional experts should be consulted. Increased collaboration with the traditional community will enhance access and early identi¢cation. Improved governance and management is recommended, not only for mental health o⁄cers, but also for the overall health sector. Government performance standards, improved accountability and increased transparency measures should be put into place to the extent possible. The mental health workforce should be expanded so that mental health services are maximally scaled up.Targeting primarycare providers to identify, treat and refer persons with mental disorders willprovide direct access to a great number of people. Workforce expansion should include mental health training for primary care providers and support sta¡, including: psychologists, clinical social workers, psychiatric nurses, Iraq and mental health policy: a post invasion analysis Intervention 2011, Volume 9, Number 3, Page 332 -344 midwives and paraprofessionals. Clinical psychiatrists can contribute by transitioning their role from clinical workto training and building capacity of basic service providers. Capacity building with clinical supervision should be the role of specialist teams. If capacity is limited, policymakers must be creative with local, regional or international expert supervisory teams. Coordination with other Ministries to makeaninvestmentineducation,integrate mental health into pre service and in service training curricula, and to provide research opportunities, is recommended. Investment from within the country is essential. Transitional governments should enable and support local leadership, facilitate external experts working in conjunction with local expertise, and harness available resources within the country to promote the most culturally sensitive and appropriate solutions. E¡orts to reduce stigma, and a focus on mental health advocacy, should be integral to the overall health promotion strategy. This can be achieved through mass media educational campaigns, awareness-raising activities, emphasis on primary health care and education and links with community stakeholders. Advocacy for mental health care should come from all sectors, and should focus on human rights. Development of consumer groups and family/caretaker coalitions can be advantageous in providing support. Mental health care includes not only treatment of people with mental disorders, but also a deeper understanding of local risk and protective factors, and the development of targeted community and psychosocial interventions. Although cited speci¢c to the Iraqi context, the culture of hierarchy within medicine and across all disciplines relevant to health and wellbeing must be addressed to promote an environment of teamwork, collaboration and trust. The use of global networks and international expertise can be harnessed in resource poor settings, however, in good coordination with the new government in power. Links should be made with religious and traditional healers. Capacity building, involvement in stakeholder meetings and education are some of the recommended activities among community leaders and healers. The recommendations above are speci¢c to this analysis of Iraq, and are also in line with expert opinion and international guidelines. This study demonstrates the di⁄culties of mental health policy development in a fragile state, but also highlights that progress can occur with a core set of activities and priorities. It is the author's hope that this analysis will provide insight to policymakers and practitioners in post con£ict settings, and contribute to the development of mental health care in the most vulnerable settings.
